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SYMPOSIUM ON BIOINFORMATICS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
APRIL 27,2001-BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
DATA PROTECTION STATUTES AND BIOINFORMATIC
DATABASES
PROFESSORDOGAN:
We have heard from the lawyer, the advocate's perspective of some of the
legal issues involved in database protection and bioinformatics, and now we
are going to hear an academic perspective on these issues. Professor Dennis
Karjala is a professor at the Arizona State University College of Law with an
interesting background. He has a Ph.D. in electrical engineering and taught in
that field before going to law school at Boalt, and he is an internationally
renowned expert on copyright law and computer law issues. Professor Karjala
is going to talk to us about database protection issues. His presentation will be
followed by some comments from Professor Simon Kasif, who is a professor
of bioinformatics and biomedical engineering here at BU and also holds
positions at Cambridge Research Lab and MIT. Professor Kasif has an
interesting background in artificial intelligence and parallel and distributed
computing algorithms. Professor Wendy Gordon, who needs no introduction
to this audience at the School of Law, is one of the most renowned experts in
copyright law and intellectual property law, and we will look forward to
hearing her comments after those of Professor Kasif.
PROFESSORDENNIS KARJALA:
Thank you very much Stacey, and thank you to all of you, and to the
sponsors for inviting me. It is a pleasure to be here. I have been assigned the
topic of database protection in the context of bioinformatics. I thought I would
try to give a short introduction to the problem - why we are talking so much
about database protection today, and particularly the proposals for new
legislation - by saying a little bit today about scientific and bioinformatic
databases generally. I will tell you what I know about them in the light of the
goals of that I see for database protection. If time permits, I will compare
some of the existing proposals for specific, statutory database protection
outside the paradigms of traditional patent, copyright, and trade secret.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587916
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As I am sure all of you know, in the United States we protect compilations
(if at all) under copyright law. For many years copyright protection, at least in
the United States, was applied pursuant to the so-called sweat-of-the-brow
theory of originality. This approach protected factual compilations in a kind of
cumbersome and unpredictable manner.
Although it lacked theoretical
justification, it was, in my mind, serviceable in the days when most of the
compilation litigation in copyright was over things like telephone books. In
applying copyright to the protection of factual information, courts were trying
to prevent market failure or misappropriation, where people spent a lot of time
and money compiling data and, once it was available, others could take it very
easily. This was a problem before the electronic age. It was exacerbated by
the ease of copying works in digital form. The Feist1 case, as everybody
knows, changed the picture quite a bit. In Feist, the Court concluded that the
copyright definition of compilation did not cover information as such, but
rather only creative selections and arrangements of information. And by way
of strong dictum, Feist raised this analysis to a constitutional level, suggesting
that Congress actually lacks the power to protect writings that are not creative.
An important result of Feist was that facts are not protected by copyright.
Consequently, under Feist, comprehensive, nonselective databases are simply
not eligible for protection unless they are creatively arranged. Electronic
databases, of course, have no real arrangement - if you are downloading just
the data from them, you are not taking the arrangement or the computer
program that does the organization. One side of the problem, then, is that Feist
opens up these informational databases to the danger of electronic theft or
misappropriation. The other side - this is the side that has worried me even
more from the beginning with Feist - is that courts have strong negative
reactions to what they view as theft, misappropriation, or reaping where
someone else has sown. This activity engenders all sorts of negative reactions
and colorful pejorative language. Courts try to find ways not to allow what
they perceive as theft or misappropriation, and they have been trying to find
ways around Feist.
So, on the one hand, Feist could leave some very expensive and very
difficult to create, if intellectually noncreative, databases fully unprotected by
the law. On the other hand, if the courts go too far in trying to find methods of
protection, they end up protecting creative systems and methodologies for
presenting information. I think that is equally dangerous. There are many
examples now in traditional copyright where the courts are doing exactly that.
The basis of the movement for database protection statutes is the former.
Database producers are saying, "We do not have enough protection; Feist has
left us out in the cold." The rest of us are worried about the latter, saying that
maybe there is a need for some protection to fill some of the gaps created by
Feist,but we do not want to go too far and actually end up giving intellectual
property rights to factual information itself.

I Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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I will not dwell on the constitutionality question today, but a number of
scholars have construed Feist's dictum that creativity is a constitutional
requirement to render much database legislation unconstitutional. If Feist's
dictum is in fact intended to be taken seriously, that is, Congress may not even
have the power to adopt at least some forms of database protection legislation
under the intellectual property clause. To protect such a work requires
creativity and authorship, and that is not there by definition. The Commerce
Clause, moreover, may not be available to override an express limitation on a
specific power. Finally, there may be some First Amendment limitations as
well unless the statute is properly tailored.
Feist was warmly welcomed, at the time, by many of my colleagues in
academe who study intellectual property. I was always somewhat nervous
about it for the reason I just mentioned: I thought it was going to induce, and I
think it has induced, courts to become overly protective in areas of functional
methodologies that really do not belong in copyright at all. So I think Feisthas
been a problem, but for those who are interested in bioinformatics in particular,
it may be what was needed. I do not think the old sweat-of-the-brow theory of
originality was really up to the task of balancing incentives for creation and the
needs of users in any specific community, and, particularly in the scientific
community. As we just heard from Tom Meyers, the kinds of bioinformatic
information being created are complex. The information itself is dispersed,
and we need much creative thought about methodologies for putting all this
information together and discovering new scientific results.
I do not know that the sweat-of-the-brow theory, which as I say, was
developed in the days when the biggest problems were basically telephone
books, was really up to the job. And what Feist is doing is forcing legislative
consideration. We have had consideration in Congress now for the past four
years. I do not think anything has yet been introduced in the current Congress,
but there are certainly threats. Nothing has been more than a threat thus far,
but Representative Coble, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, has said that he will
introduce legislation shortly if the two sides who are now arguing do not get
together. The chairs of the House Judiciary and Commerce Committees have
also said there will be database legislation this year. So I think there will be
action. With proper database protection legislation, science may continue to
progress in the way it always has with the benefits of full and free information
exchange and yet still have the necessary incentives to create the bioinformatic
databases and other methodologies that may well be necessary to the progress
of science. The question here is, what would a "proper" database protection
statute look like?
Scientific databases are often very large and very complex. They are
becoming indispensable in many fields of science, and not just biology.
Important results, as Tom mentioned earlier, often depend on finding
connections between apparently isolated facts. There are a few needles in
very, very large data haystacks. Much of the science that is being conducted
today seems to derive from the ability to combine data that is dispersed
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587916
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throughout many sources. Apparently there are many biological databases
today, including twelve or fifteen large ones in connection with the Human
Genome Project. This latter may not sound like a large number, but scientists
have been trying to coordinate data exchange among the people engaged in the
Human Genome Project, and even purely as a bioinformatics problem, there
have been many difficulties with format incompatibilities and so forth. The
Interet - I think Tom has mentioned this problem - has exacerbated the
problem because many individuals now publish their data as soon as they get
it, and they are published all over the world and in nonstandard formats and
conventions.
So, we have all this data out there in need of coordination. Tom
distinguished between data and information, and, that is a distinction we must
bear in mind. We, that is, the scientific community, must have databases that
are, in fact, usable, and we cannot expect everyone to be as fully conversant
with the informatics aspect of bioinformatics as the computer scientists. Thus,
we need databases that biologists from a wide range of fields can use without
wasting time trying to get up to date on the information technology. In other
words, they are interested in data, not information.
The information
technologists who create the databases also have an interest in not tying up
data, as opposed to information, too strongly. They might get patents for all
sorts of great acquisition, retrieval, and presentation inventions (information),
but if they do not have any data, they will not have much of a database. These
patents are not going to make much money unless data is available. Thus, if
people have intellectual property rights down to the level of the data,
downstream problems for later use and combination will affect not only the
biologists seeking to use the databases to make important combinatorial
discoveries but also the rightsholders in the technologies underlying the
databases.
Another potential problem of data protection is that scientists may become
reluctant to share data as they have in the past. All lawyers follow the rule that
if you do not know what you are doing, you keep things close to your vest.
Scientists, who are used to the free exchange of information, may start saying,
"Well, I have some data here that does not seem to be of much use right now,
but it is very interesting, so who knows? Maybe there could be some use for it,
so I better not release it." There is also the argument on the other side, though,
that proprietary rights may not interfere very much if economic forces are
working properly - that is, proprietary rights may not slow down the exchange
- because people will find that even if they have proprietary rights, they can
make more money by pooling and sharing than by hoarding information.
Where one party has just a small piece and a hundred other people each have
just a small piece, however, nothing is accomplished unless everyone puts it
together in collaboration. If that is the way things develop, that will be fine,
but I am not so sure we can just start giving a lot of statutory protection and
hope things will develop that way. Free exchange of scientific information has
been the norm from the beginning of science. We should hesitate before
establishing rules that threaten to change that norm.
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Bioinformatics, in particular, requires the integration of data from a wide
range of sources. This is another point that Tom made: Biology is increasingly
a computer game, and we have the biology and informatics people working
hand-in-hand as developments in one field feed the other back and forth. It is a
very complex game now, and development of the necessary databases is itself
dependent on access to data from diverse sources, so we have to make sure the
data is available. Building on existing results and including them in new and
improved databases is, to me, a simple and obvious way of building ever better
databases, but achieving that result through legal incentives requires some
thought. If we start giving database rights, we will begin with a few databases
in which people have rights. When people later think of ways to build bigger
and better databases, they will have to negotiate for the information from the
first generation of database builders. It could well be that the vast amounts of
information that are arising out of bioinformatics will create an anti-commons
problem, with too many people holding too many rights in too many small
pieces. That, too, is something we have to think about.
The question is, then, how do we insure continued database development
and improvement, once we start giving database rights? I think we must
remember what the goal of database protection legislation is. That goal is the
narrow one of curing the market failure - if there is a market failure - that was
created by Feist. I would recommend covering only databases that are offered
as databases for commercial purposes, and I would limit the coverage to
databases that are truly comprehensive and cohesive bodies of information, not
just traditional scientific information that may in fact be a collection of interrelated information. We want to minimize the effect, obviously, on the
traditional exchange of information among scientists. We also want to
minimize the effect on intellectual property law generally, because the problem
(if there is one) that we are trying to solve is quite narrow. We want to make
sure that "databases" do not swallow up all of copyright law, for example,
which has been carefully honing its balances between creation incentives and
free use for several centuries. Therefore, we should exclude from database
coverage everything that is covered by patent and copyright, with the
exception of traditional compilations. I am not so sure that the existing
proposals, certainly not those in Europe, do that, although I do not have time
today to analyze the statutory language (which may change, in any event).
Finally, we need to deal with the question of downstream uses and noncommercial copying. I do not have too much time left, so let me just give you
a brief introduction to what is happening with database protection in Europe,
where an actual Directive is in place in the European Union. Discussion of one
recent development, I hope, will show some of the real problems that can come
from database legislation. The main point I wish to emphasize about the EU
directive is that it provides a right for protection in databases that show a
"qualitative or quantitative" investment, and prohibits extraction that is
"qualitatively or quantitatively" substantial. These words, "qualitatively or
quantitatively," have been driving me crazy. They are the worst parts of the
EU directive, and we will see why in just a minute.
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The case I will discuss is a very recent one out of the UIC 2 It does not
involve scientific databases, but the reasoning of the court, I think, shows that
our worst fears about the EU directive may be realized. The plaintiff was the
British Horseracing Board, which collects data on all horse racing in England.
They have mountains of data in their database. The defendant, William Hill, is
the largest bookmaking organization in England. It has shops all over the
place, which were not involved in the suit, and they are now allowing betting
over the Internet. William Hill obtains information on today's races from a
satellite feed that itself is licensed by the plaintiff British Horseracing Board.
The satellite feed gets the information directly from the plaintiff's computer,
and then, William Hill gets the information from the satellite feed for screen
display showing what horses are running at what tracks and at what times.
Now, believe it or not, the court held that without getting a license from the
British Horseracing Board, William Hill was violating the EU Database
Directive and violating the plaintiff's database rights. The court found that
there was systematic arrangement of the database, which is a necessary
condition under the Directive for protection of the database. The court goes on
to say, however that it is the data that is protected and not the arrangement.
Thus, the condition for protection is fully divorced from the protection that is
recognized when the condition is satisfied. Even though William Hill only
took a tiny portion of the total amount of data stored, it relied on the
completeness and accuracy of the information, as of course would anyone who
was going to make a bet. So, qualitatively, this was very important
information, and that was enough for the court. Taking the information
indirectly from the satellite service rather than directly from the database does
not change anything because the use is substantial. Even the fact that the same
information was published in the Racing Form makes no difference. As a last
resort, William Hill offered to just number the horses rather than name them,
and omit giving the race times by saying first race, second race, third race, and
so on. The court concluded that even doing that would violate the Directive
because defendant would still essentially be getting the information out of the
protected database.
As I read this decision, it gives a complete monopoly on information that
only the plaintiff Board can create. The Board makes the decisions on who
races where, so it is operating a what has been called a "single source"
database. But what kind of incentive is needed to create this kind of database?
The Board must create this information in any event. We do not need to give
the Board an incentive to tell us who is racing today. Its business is
horseracing, and nobody is going to place bets on races unless they know who
is running, where, and at what time. This is information that is going to be
produced independent of any database right. The court's interpretation results

2 British Horseracing Board v. William Hill (High Court of Justice, Chancery Division,
Patents Court, Feb. 9, 2001).
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in a property right in information that does not add anything to the intellectual
property equation.
It is extremely important for the future of bioinformatics that we consider
this question of property rights in scientific information very carefully. We
may need some sort of intellectual property protection in order to supply the
incentives to make the necessary investments, but we have to be very, very
careful that we do not go as far as the court in BritishHorseracingBoard.
Thank you. (applause)
PROFESSOR DOGAN:
We will now hear from Professor Kasif and Professor Gordon, and then we
will take questions at the end.
PROFESSOR SIMON KASIF:
Good morning. Thank you very much for inviting me. I will start my short
presentation with a couple of apologies. First, I am not very well educated in
the law, and I find myself a little bit humbled talking to a group of people who
are very smart and have thought about these issues in detail. All I know about
the law is watching Ally McBeal here and there. (laughter)So that is my first
apology. The second is that I was told this meeting was very informal. I do
own a tie, so - (laughter) I was also told by the organizers that I should give
some general comments rather than focusing on a specific topic. I will
therefore make some very high-level comments about bioinformatics and the
legal challenges it creates.
One important point to remember is that work in biology and computer
science relevant to this field has been going on for a long time. However, a
real revolution happened in 1995 when Craig Venter and his group published a
paper in Science- on their high-throughput - some call it a shotgun sequencing of the Haemophilus influenza bacterium, and it really changed the
biotechnology world. I have been working with TIGR and other major
sequencing institutes for many, many years, and I watched this revolution
unfold, which triggered the information explosion we are seeing today.
The most important causal event to focus on from the legal point of view
here is the radical change that this genomic revolution created in a biology
laboratory. In the past the classical approach taken by many biologists, even
very famous ones with a lot of resources, was reductionism, focusing on
research dedicated to a single gene or protein. A big lab was working on
something like a P450, or other proteins that have important functions such as
oncogenes, G-proteins, receptors, transcription factors, or enzymes. This
approach was popular for years and years and indeed resulted in numerous

3 See R. D. Fleischmann, et al., Whole-Genome Random Sequencing and Assembly of

Haemophilus influenzaeRd, SciENcE, July 28, 1995, at 496.
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significant discoveries produced at a relatively slow pace. Even Craig Venter,
before he switched to the new high-throughput biology mode, was essentially
working on a single protein.
The previous classical approach to biology research naturally implies that
the number of patents we can file is obviously limited. The first genome
sequenced (H. Influenza) is quite long, and, generally, in a typical bacterial
genome you might be filing patents on 4000 genes. If you basically switch
gears and focus on eukaryotic genomes like the human genome, you might be
filing patents on 40,000 to 100,000 genes. Therefore, sequencing and other
high-throughput profiling technologies affect the level of engagement of this
particular community, I think that is where the legal community might want to
think about its ability to track and legally support this rapid pace of new
inventions and discoveries.
The high-throughput capability of doing sequencing is one element of this
new reality, and the second element is the computing power that has now made
the process of interpretation of data largely automatic. I was a member of the
International Genome Consortium at the Whitehead Institute at MIT that did
the human genome analysis in a "competitive" effort to the one at Celera. The
majority of the effort to produce the annotation of the genome, was done more
or less automatically by computers. So again you have this extremely highthroughput information pipeline that goes from biology into computers and
generates many new potential genomic territories where you can place your
legal markers and establish turf. I think that's really the key issue for this
community to worry about.
Now I want to pose a few questions that I personally find very challenging,
though I am not sure how to answer them in a way that is simple and satisfying
to a large number of scientists, medical doctors, and most importantly people
that actually need the cure that is provided by some of the drug targets.
The questions are: What is a gene? What is the function of a gene? What is
a genome? Are there any laws in biology? And what is a bioinformatics
database? I will go through these questions quickly. Sometimes we are used
to thinking by analogies; the best analogy I could come up with was this: The
human genome looks a little bit similar to the Web. Why is that? It is very
large and noisy. It is a little bit about sex. (laughter) It gets attacked by
viruses. Portions of it are copied continuously. It needs lots of machines for
analysis. The more you know, the more confusing it is. When you know a
little bit, you start a dot-com. And the legal implication is that it is a mess.
So I do not know if this gives you any kind of legal precedent (laughter),
but I find these seemingly disparate phenomena very similar. So what is a
gene? There are many confusing definitions, and of course in high school, you
hear the word gene and you associate it with an inherited trait - the gene for
blue eyes, right? - which is highly misleading actually. I have a daughter who
has red hair, and neither I nor my wife have red hair. Initially, I was quite
worried. (laughter), so I went to my colleagues, who are biologists, and they
explained to me that color of hair is a very complicated complex but that I was
probably okay. (laughter) Anyway, the definition of a gene is rather
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587916
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complicated. In the context of filing a patent on a gene, I want to point out a
few technical matters we will go into next. Here is a very simple picture of
what is called the central dogma in biology. One of the most important images
in biology corresponds to an image in a region in a genome, which we call a
gene, and we find many such typical pictures on the human genome.
The interesting thing to notice about this picture is that it has regions within
the so-called gene that contain sequences that code for a protein, and they are
called exons. Somehow biology is very clever, being able to cut out the
unimportant regions called introns and glue (ligate) together the exons to
produce a single sequence which then can be translated into protein, which you
already know is one of the building blocks of life. Genes are sequences, but
when you say something is a gene, it is a little bit confusing, because if you
look at this picture, you have this long region that has exons and introns, and
the exons are put together by biologic mechanisms to produce a protein. But
here is the real complication. Most of you have probably read that both teams
that worked on the human genome found less than 30,000 genes, and it was a
big surprise. What happened?
One of the plausible explanations has to do with a process called alternative
splicing, and alternative splicing means basically that there are many different
possibilities for the biological mechanism to cut the exons out and glue them
together to produce different forms of proteins. In particular it is more likely
to occur in human beings than in lower-order eukaryotes. Our brain, for
example, has many, many neural receptors that are very commonly
alternatively spliced, and, on average we expect every gene to have three or
more alternative splicing mechanisms. Thus, there are three alternative
proteins that emerge from a single gene that could each have a different
function during development, during different ages, during different evolutions
of the cell, and so on.
As we move forward, this is an important point to remember. Consider a
microbial genome. It has coding regions and intermediate regions, called
intergenic regions (no introns). In microbes, it is pretty simple: There is one
region that codes for information, which may be called a gene. In human
beings, there is a more complicated picture with regions coding for proteins
and the intermediate regions do not, but, surprisingly, you can put many
patterns together in an alternatively spliced coding regions in many different
ways, and as a result you can get many different answers what a gene might be.
Now that we know, more or less, what a gene is - of course, we also know it
is difficult to say what a gene exactly is - let us ask a different question: How
do you assign a function to a gene? That is really the biggest mess to address,
and we are dealing with it daily. As it turns out, it is actually another
complicated topic. As you know, nature tends to be very lazy. It does not like
to invent new things; it likes to reuse things that were already invented. As a
result, genes have multiple functions in different contexts. So when you say
something has a function, it is a very subtle statement, and one of the reasons
people are having trouble unifying databases is that they very often do not
agree on function. One person is using a neural network to predict what a gene
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587916
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function is, while another person is using a different kind of predictive
network, and, as a result, they get different answers and cannot unify them. Of
course, there are big egos involved, which is a factor as well. There is MIT,
and there is BU. It is not so easy to unify those things. (laughter)
One potentially useful way to think about a database of genomic information
is as a database of cases, which I will explain in just a moment. Some of the
most important gene laws I can think of from the point of view of intellectual
property issues and patent laws. First, many genes are similar to each other. In
particular, there are some gene clusters or protein clusters that have 10,000 to
20,000 members. So when you say, I have a patent on this gene, you really are
defining a very large territory, and that territory is very difficult to characterize
precisely because we know very little about that family. Sometimes, as we go
to the third or fourth item in the family, we see only ten to thirty percent of
identity among members in a sequence - ten percent identity of a very long
sequence might mean they have the same function. However, sometimes one
little change will make the two genes work very differently. When you patent
that element, most of the time you are not aware of what a mutant is going to
do, so how are you going to argue later on whether the new behavior of a
mutant was already anticipated?
So basically when you talk about a gene database, the sequences on their
own have very little meaning. Someone mentioned this - databases versus
information. Very often what we do is we actually group those sequences
together into what we call a profile, which is a descriptive way to basically
describe this family like a case in the legal system. And then we use analogy
and similarity methods to argue that this gene and another gene have the same
function because the following similarities hold over. That is a very important
argument in this field, in bioinformatics, because those similarities are studied
by researchers, papers are written about those similarities just as papers are
written about case-based analysis. In this context, I think the most important
gene law is, perhaps, the exceptions to the law. Genomic databases are similar
to databases of legal cases because we conduct analogy-driven reasoning
which perhaps leads to some interesting methodological implications for both
communities.
To summarize, the increase throughput of biological discovery poses many
challenges to scientists and lawyers. Since many of these discoveries present
important opportunities to improve the quality of life, much legal work has to
be undertaken in order to make the process of moving biological discovery into
practice efficiently. In other words, the future looks bright for biologists,
engineers and lawyers.
Thank you. (applause)
PROFESSOR. WENDY GORDON:
Dennis Karjala helpfully covered most of the issues. I have a few points to
add.
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This is the second time that Professor Karjala and I have met on the issue of
databases. I am glad to say that he seems to be more cautious about database
ownership now than he appeared to be then. Caution is appropriate, as I hope
my preliminary remarks will help to show. I will close my remarks by
discussing a philosophic dilemma inherent in the controversy.
First I turn to the practical issue of assessing what consequences database
protection would produce. I do not think there is a proven need for giving
persons who produce noncreative databases legal protection against copying.
At most, there may be need for the law to give database-makers a limited tort
right to restrain, for a short periods of time, wholesale and commercially
destructive appropriation. 5 Rights that are broader, especially those that
approach "ownership" rights, are very troubling. They pose a danger to the
spread of knowledge, and I suspect will yield little countervailing benefit.
I have some hypotheses about why, aside from considerations of Realpolitik,
Congress might keep toying with statutes which would give ownership rights
in databases. One hypothesis is that many on the Hill share the plausible,
alluring, but incorrect assumption that privatizing ownership always results in
increasing wealth.
Privatization may reliably increase the wealth of some individuals, but the
private capture of wealth is only part of the story. More important is the
overall total of social welfare. Except in unusual cases that have special
justification, as a society we do not want to increase private individuals' wealth
at the expense of everyone else. American copyright law already protects
creative arrangements and creative selection of data. What it does not do is
give copyright protection for data itself. To change that rule - to privatize
public-domain information - could cause a net decrease in social wealth
because it would raise the price of follow-on innovation and in some cases
could even prevent later developments.
When the suggestion is made to give ownership in data, therefore, Congress
should not rely on intuition. It must demand empirical proof that this legal
change will effect a net benefit socially.
I think the pro-ownership attitude is also partially driven by sibling rivalry,
the notion that Germany and France have something that we do not have.
They have the EU Database Directive, 6 and so by reflex, some of us want it
too. But I think the EU countries are, in the long run, going to be worse off
with their Database Directive than they would have been without it. We should
not emulate an action that would be burdensome. We need to be smarter than
4See Dennis S. Kariala, Copyright Symposium PartII: Copyright andMisappropriation,17
U. DAYTONL. REv. 885 (1992).
5 For an alternative formulation of a database tort, see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning

Information:IntellectualPropertyand the RestitutionaryImpulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 22223 (1992).
6Also important is the related issue of reciprocity. See Amy C. Sullivan, When the Creative
is the Enemy of the True: DatabaseProtection in the U.S. andAbroad,29 AIPLA Q. J. 317,
325 & n.93 (2001).
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those boys who were bamboozled into taking over Tom Sawyer's fencepainting chores.
If we are going to have database protection, however, I think Professor
Karjala well indicated some of the main things about which we have to be
careful. First of all, in terms of what counts as an actionable taking from a
database, it should not be just "any" taking or one that is so flexibly defined,
quantitatively or qualitatively, that the law has a chilling effect on creating
databases. People who use data can generate large benefits for all of us. We
do not want vague laws to discourage beneficial behavior. If there is going to
be any database protection at all, it should be clearly defined to operate only
against wholesale, large-scale, commercial misappropriation.
Second, in terms of what kind of databases should be covered, there need to
be limits on subject matter. As Professor Karjala indicated indirectly through
his discussion of the British horseracing case, one of the things that should not
be given over to private ownership is data that comes from only one source.
For ordinary data, ownership means that potential users must either purchase
access rights from the owner, or "re-invent the wheel" by gathering the desired
information themselves. Among other things, this second option places a
ceiling on the price that the 'owner' of a database can charge: He cannot
charge more than it would cost a stranger to gather the material himself. But
with sole-source data, this salutary ceiling can be absent. If our law were to
give to the sources of sole-source data the right to own it, that could foreclose
all other persons from the possibility of gathering the data independently.
Thus, unique monopoly problems would ensue from protection.
Also, the producer of unique information, the source of the data, often has
no incentive difficulties. If his activity generates data that is publicly valuable,
then he often will have an activity that is valuable in itself and that generates
revenues.

Thus, football teams generate data - game scores - and also

generate much revenue from charging admission to the games and for licenses
to broadcast the games. Whether or not the teams can own their scores, their
valuable activities will continue, and for them, the incremental incentive
effects of data ownership are therefore small.
Most important are the issues of scientific progress and free speech. From
the perspective of the First Amendment I can imagine few more pernicious
dangers than putting a fact into the ownership of only one person, or allowing
an entity who generates a fact (whether the entity be a football league or a
government) to control how it is used.
In the United States, the National Football League did sue the State of
Delaware once for daring to make a lottery that made reference to the NFL
game results.7 But in our country, the sports league lost their litigation, unlike
the British Horseracing Board.
In discussing this issue of sole source, Professor Karjala highlighted many
of the goals that can be served and disserved by database protection. I am
7National Football League v. Governor of State of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977).
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hoping that this afternoon, Professor Arti Rai along with the virtual godmother
of the field, Professor Rebecca Eisenberg, will speak further on how the law
might minimize the negative effects on traditional information exchange
among scientists. For myself, in the short time remaining, let me add a
simplifying model to illustrate a philosophic tension that underlies many issues
in data policy.

-

First of all, as Professor Karjala observed, there is a great desire among
courts to punish a defendant who appears to be a bad actor. I suggest that the
most relevant type of bad actor can be seen in the writings of two quite
different philosophers: John Locke and Emmanuel Kant. That bad actor is
someone who is motivated to act solely because he sees someone else who is
vulnerable, and he wants to take advantage of that vulnerability.
Often what we do happens to hurt someone else. Someone who enters a
race wants to win, and if she does win she will deprive someone else of the
chance to be first. But no one considers that kind of harm morally wrong.
Much of law and morality seeks to judge what harms constitute wrongs and
which do not. The question is difficult when someone who has an
independently-determined course of behavior happens to hurt someone else,
but it seems clear to all of us that someone acts wrongfully when he chooses a
course of behavior only because he wants to make himself better off at
another's expense. Such an actor not only prefers his own welfare to
another's, but also is willing to sacrifice that other person to his own ends.
In Locke's terms, this bad actor is the "covetous" person who is not
"industrious" and "rational" but merely seeks to "take advantage of another's
pains." s For Kant, this bad actor is a person who fails to live by
universalizable moral tenets: He treats another in a way he would not want
himself to be treated. 9
What do we call this bad actor? I do not want to call him a "free rider"
because we all ride freely on the culture we did not create. Free riding can be a
wonderful thing, as Jefferson pointed out: We can all light our candles from
your taper without diminishing your light. We all free ride without harming
you, and thereby bring illumination to the world.
Sometimes - and only rarely - should we condemn those who "reap without
sowing." What makes a civilization is the accretion of knowledge and skills
that let most of the civilization's members "reap without sowing" most of the
time. We need therefore to avoid the "free rider" label as drastically
overbroad.

8 JOHN LOCKE, TWo TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University

Press 1988) (3d ed. 1698, corrected by Locke), as discussed in Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
IntellectualProperty, 102 YALE L. J. 1533, 1535-78 (1993).

9 On Kantian notions of doing unjustifiable harm, see Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and
Consequences: The Force ofBaclanail'sCentral Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1758-66

(1993).
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Instead let us call the bad actor I see in both Locke and Kant an
"opportunist." I think it is the image of this opportunist and the desire to strip
him of his perceived unjust enrichment that motivates many courts and
policymakers.1 0 And if the world of intellectual property had only two parties
- the hardworking laborer and the opportunistic second comer - the moral case
against the opportunist would be inarguable. However, in the real world, it is
never just two people who are involved. There are also customers and the
larger public.
If the opportunistic bad actor is restrained, a valuable kind of dissemination
and creative use may be restrained. Whatever the opportunist's motives, she
may serve the public good. She may make data available at lower cost or
otherwise make it capable of reaching additional persons or being put to new
uses by customers. Therefore, there can be conflicts between the morality of
opposing opportunism and the consequentialist morality that seeks to increase
the amount of welfare in the world.
To envisage this, consider ordinary competition. If you develop a new
market and come up with something that is not patented but serves a great
public need, Mr. A may be lured to your market simply by the promise of
earning a supernormal profit. By copying you, he can earn some easy dollars.
You have done all the marketing research, you have taken risks, and you have
discovered this great niche. And the only reason Mr. A is going to follow on is
because Mr. A thinks there is a profit he can obtain by selling a little more
cheaply than you and by taking from your market. Mr. A certainly looks like
an opportunist. But Mr. A is also the person who is going to drive the price
down and help consumers get a valuable product much more easily.
Judges in intellectual property disputes tend to focus on the two most salient
parties: the hardworking author or database gatherer, on the one hand, and, on
the other, a defending party who may appear to be motivated by grabbing a
quick buck. The latter looks like an opportunist, and a desire often arises to
make the opportunist "disgorge" what is seen as his "unjust enrichment." 11
There is a problem, however, with giving data protection out of a desire to
punish the opportunism seen in the two-person model: the effect on the larger
public.

1oSee generally Gordon, supra note 5.

1 The highest court of the State of Illinois gave protection to the Dow Jones Average based
on a theory of misappropriation. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co.,
Inc., 98 Ill. 2d 109 (1983). The dissent noted:
The majority is swayed by what it sees as 'unjust' enrichment - the Board of Trade's
plan to earn a profit by the free use of an idea developed by Dow Jones at considerable
cost. I do not regard this use as 'unjust' in the least. The Board of Trade proposed to
use information that Dow Jones had freely allowed the public to acquire in a business
that Dow Jones has not shown the slightest interest in pursuing. If 'unjust enrichment'
has become the only element for the tort of misappropriation in Illinois, I fear that there
will be few commercial ideas and little information left in the public domain.
Id. at 127 (Simon, J, dissenting).
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Our social dialogue has many ways of integrating two-person and multiperson models of morality and of integrating consequentialist and nonconsequentialist approaches. We must not hide behind the rhetoric of unjust
enrichment or "reaping and sowing" to shirk these difficult tasks.
Thank you. (applause)

QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
MODERATOR:
Questions from the floor? Yes.
Q: AUDIENCE:
Professor Gordon, what is the incentive, as the individual compiling the
database to disseminate that information to the public?
A: PROFESSOR. GORDON:
That is a wonderful question. It is most useful when turned around: Given
the lack of formal protection for noncreative databases now in the United
States, why do we have so many databases? One answer might be that lead
time, physical protections, and already-existing interstitial legal protections
provide enough shelter for incentives to survive. Thus, a database producer
can sometimes use encryption, physical walls, and the law of tangible property
or contract to assist him. Some states might even be willing to give the
database compiler a misappropriation cause of action. In addition, of course,
federal copyright protects creatively arranged or selected databases. And
perhaps most importantly, the authorized producer has advantages in being
able to produce timely, guaranteed, and conveniently-packaged material.
Another strong reason why we have a great deal of data generated at the
moment, despite the absence of ownership in pure data, is the existence of
incentives in the marketplace other than revenues from sales. These alternative
incentive sources include government funding, tenure, and the beneficial
reputational side effects that a data-generator receives from publicizing her
research.
I am still waiting for the empirical case supporting database ownership to be
proven. I am open to the possibility that it can be proven, and if it were, I
might change my view in some respects, but I am not yet persuaded. I will
give you one example of the many kinds of alternative incentives that exist.
Back in the early days of Feist,Professor Karjala and I were at a conference
addressing what was going to happen, now that the Supreme Court had ruled
that no copyright subsists in the alphabetical and comprehensive listings of
phonebook white pages. One industry representative noted that despite the
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new decision that there continues to be a reliance on licensing to collect
information for databases. 12 So in many instances, the Feist decision has not
changed the business of licensing data access. Royalties and incentives were
present even in the absence of ownership.
Now, I do not want to overstate the force of one example. Some observers
point to ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenbergi3 to suggest that sometimes the absence of
legal protection will result in potentially destructive copying of databases. I
am willing to concede the possibility, but only as a bare possibility. In my
view, even in the instance of ProCD,neither the plaintiff nor the judge made a
strong economic case for data protection for reasons I have explored
elsewhere. 14
In sum, there already exist clearly significant incentives that can keep
money flowing to database creators.
A: PROFESSOR. KARJALA:
Just to add to the ProCD discussion - I am glad Wendy mentioned it - I
think that is an example in which some form of statutory protection might be
necessary or at least helpful. It is the same argument that I suggested in my
talk for some very limited form of data protection statute: If we do not do it
with a limited statute, we may find the courts doing it much more expansively,
and ProCD v. Zeidenberg is a good example. In ProCD,protection of a digital
telephone book was based on a shrink-wrap license. Protection on that ground
is very dangerous. The ProCD court emphasized the amount of money and
effort that went into creating the digital directory, which was electronically
copied and offered free over the Internet. Thus, by remedying a perceived
misappropriation that, if allowed, would have acted as a disincentive to invest
in digital telephone directories, the court greatly broadened the rights of
software suppliers who seek to control uses of their software - even uses that
copyright law permits - pursuant to shrinkwrap or clickwrap licenses. That, I
think, is very dangerous because the public interest is out of the picture
12See Steven J. Metalitz, Copyright Symposium Part 11: Presentationby Steven J. Metalitz,
Esq., 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 775, 783 (1992). The author continued:
Within weeks after the [Feist] decision, information crossed my desk about a new CDROM product that consisted of scanning white pages onto CD-ROM. That product has
proven successful and fills a market need. But at the same time the licensing
agreement, even for telephone directories, is essential if you want the best possible
product. If you want the most up-to-date listings, you do not want to wait until the
directory comes out, you want to license the tapes of updates immediately, and for a
variety of other reasons, while you may be able to make a non-infringing product
without a licensing agreement, you are, in most cases, going to make a better product
with a licensing agreement.
Id.
's 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
14See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual PropertyAs Price Discrimination:Implications For
Contract,73 Cm-KENTL. Rnv. 1367 (1998).
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completely, and the whole situation is reduced to two-party analysis. That is
not the way intellectual property historically has worked, and, in my opinion, it
is not the way it should work. Defining rights or remedies by means of legal
rules that do not take the public interest into consideration will result in longterm losses that greatly outweigh whatever short-term gains come from the
increased incentive. A properly limited statute can obviate this kind of judicial
legislation.

Q: AUDIENCE:
I have a factual question for Dr. Kasif. In your work with bioinformatics
databases, how much invaluable information that you deal with is in the public
domain versus how much is in proprietary databases, either of your own
creation or ones from which you purchased or licensed information for your
institution's use?
A: PROFESSOR. KASIF:
That is a loaded question because, as you well know, there are different
ways of answering those questions. For example, this is different from a
public domain versus private access issue. I think what you will find across
the community of scientists, there has been a split on this issue. The main
reason there is a split is the following. It depends what you want out of the
others. Most drug companies, no matter how big they are, actually chase very
few drug targets. They probably know that the top pipeline is very expensive
to use. We do not have resources to it. So the question is, why do they need
this enormous database to chase one drug target? For-the various reasons,
basically they can be useful. But I think the answer to your question truly
depends on the scientist's own application. Some information could be in
public areas, and some different type information might not be in public areas.
So another kind of database that may become very, very important are SNP
databases. SNP databases are databases of single nucleotide polymorphisms.
These are, for example, very important in cancer studies. A number of
companies are doing database compilations of these SNPs.
Q: AUDIENCE:
I think it is very important to consider incentives in this analysis.
A: MODERATOR:
There is the additional question, of course, of whether those private
databases exist, in part, through contract law and, whether the arrangements
between the enterprises that rely on those databases are enforceable through
existing contract law, or, whether sui generis protection is necessary or
preferable, perhaps, to that contract law.
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A: PROFESSOR KARJALA:
That sort of contract is often the problem because it reduces the deal to a
two-party agreement. The public interest in free flow of information may not
be served.
A: MODERATOR:
Right, so that gets back to your point that, perhaps, from the public access
perspective, sui generis protection, if cabined, might be preferable.
Q: AUDIENCE:
I just have a follow-up to that. One important limitation on contract
protection is independent creation. Independent creation is a risk to the
protection the client is getting, but it is also a limitation on the risk to the
public of these private agreements. If private agreements are too draconian,
well, then, someone else can identify a market niche there, or, they can be less
draconian and provide a competing database.
A: PROFESSORKARJALA:
Well, of course, I do not think there are any database statutes in existence or
proposed that would not create a defense for independent creation. The
problem, however, is the way people actually work with an existing database.
It does not make sense constantly to re-invent the wheel. By its very nature,
progress will come from people's reading, understanding, and using other
people's data. It is only after they have found something valuable that they
could say, "Oh, gee, I could have gathered this particular information myself."
But by that time, they have already used the existing data. In other words,
until you know what is valuable, you do not know what data "independently"
you should collect, and you only find out what data is valuable by looking at
what the rest of the scientific community has already done. At that point, the
data is no longer "independent." We should not adopt legal rules that change
this approach to doing science by making it more difficult to find and use
information already discovered by others.
Q: AUDIENCE:
We do have a SNP Consortium, 15 for example, and this is an ongoing
private effort to create SNP collections. They say, "Whoa, we do not want to
15 See SNP CONsORTIuM LTD., SINGLE NUCLEOTIDE POLYMORPHISMS FOR BIOMEDICAL
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go there. We are instead going to pool our resources and create our own
independent database." This really is a significant restriction on the ability of
private database owners to market their information.

RESEARCH, at http://snp.cshl.org (last modified Jan. 2, 2002).
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